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This was a tumultuous year for the United States SupremeCourt. On June 21, 2018, Justice Anthony Kennedyannounced his retirement after 30 years on the Court.
And President Trump nominated Judge Brett Kavanaugh to fill
the seat. 
Judge Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearings riveted and polar-
ized the nation. Late in the proceedings, multiple women
accused him of sexual misconduct. One of those women, Pro-
fessor Christine Blasey Ford, testified before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, detailing how Judge Kavanaugh allegedly
sexually assaulted her when they were in high school. Judge
Kavanaugh denied the allegations in emotional testimony that
triggered a letter from over 2,400 law professors asserting that
he “did not display the impartiality and judicial temperament
requisite to sit on the highest court of our land.”1 The Senate
nonetheless confirmed Justice Kavanaugh to the high court. 
With Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation arriving just 14
months after Justice Neil Gorsuch began his tenure, this is a
Court in transition, both in terms of its personnel and its
jurisprudence. This year’s criminal cases put that flux on dis-
play. The Court decided a high number of Fourth Amendment
cases this Term. The justices disagreed starkly over the future
of Fourth Amendment law, especially in the area of standing.
The Court also issued split decisions interpreting the First,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 
But before summarizing the Court’s criminal law cases from
2017–18, it’s worth pausing to remember Justice Kennedy’s
contributions to criminal law over the past three decades. 
JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY AND CRIMINAL LAW
In most criminal cases, Justice Kennedy voted with the con-
servative wing of the Court. He authored a number of signifi-
cant criminal procedure decisions, including Berghuis v.
Thompkins.2 There the Court held that Thompkins’s silence for
two hours and forty-five minutes was insufficient to invoke his
right to remain silent under Miranda. As one scholar put it,
Thompkins gave “us an implied waiver doctrine on steroids.”3
But Justice Kennedy’s greatest impact on criminal law was
in the death penalty area, where he commonly provided the
swing vote. Although never calling for complete abolishment,
Justice Kennedy joined his more liberal colleagues in narrow-
ing the penalty’s scope. 
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Atkins v. Virginia,4
which held that executing persons with mental disabilities vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment. He then expanded on Atkins in
Roper v. Simmons.5 He wrote for the 5–4 Roper majority that the
“Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when
their crimes were committed.”6 He pointed to the “compara-
tive immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles,” to the fact
that “juveniles have less control, or less experience with con-
trol, over their own environment,” and that “the character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”7
Justice Kennedy also wrote the majority opinion in Graham
v. Florida,8 which expanded on Roper. Graham held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for juveniles
who commit nonhomicide crimes. Roper and Graham then led
to Miller v. Alabama,9 where the Court held by 5–4 majority
that a mandatory life sentence without parole for any juvenile
offender violates the Eighth Amendment. 
The swing vote again came from Justice Kennedy in
Kennedy v. Louisiana.10 That case abolished the death penalty
for crimes not involving murder. “Evolving standards of
decency must embrace and express respect for the dignity of
the person,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, “and the
punishment of criminals must conform to that rule.”11
Justice Kennedy also advocated for human dignity within
prisons. He wrote for the 5–4 majority in Brown v. Plata,12 hold-
ing that California prison overcrowding violated the Eighth
Amendment: “A prison that deprives prisoners of basic suste-
nance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with
the concept of human dignity and has no place in a civilized
society.”13 And in a recent concurrence in Davis v. Ayala,14 Jus-
tice Kennedy lamented the “terrible price”15 of the widespread
use of solitary confinement in American prisons. He cited
numerous studies showing the harmful effects of extended iso-
lation and ended by quoting Dostoyevsky: “The degree of civi-
lization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons.”16
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Now on to the cases from the 2017–18 Term. 
FOURTH AMENDMENT
This Term was chock-full of significant Fourth Amendment
cases. The Court took particular interest in the concept of
“standing”: what a person must show to have a cognizable
Fourth Amendment interest allowing her to seek relief for an
unconstitutional search. Perhaps the most groundbreaking
Fourth Amendment opinion was Carpenter v. United States,17
where the Court held that a person has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in her cell phone location information turned
over to a third party. Carpenter limits the so-called “third party
doctrine,” though it’s not clear how much. Another important
standing case, Byrd v. United States,18 held that a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car even if she’s
not listed in the rental agreement. In Collins v. Virginia,19 the
Court decided officers need a warrant to search a vehicle
parked in the curtilage of a home. And in District of Columbia
v. Wesby20 the Court concluded that officers had probable cause
to arrest a group of trespassing partygoers and that the court
below erred by viewing facts in isolation. 
In Carpenter, police arrested four men suspected of rob-
bery, including Timothy Carpenter. Federal prosecutors
obtained telecommunications records from Carpenter’s wire-
less carriers. Those records included cell-site location informa-
tion (CSLI), time-stamped location data from each time Car-
penter’s phone connected to one of the carrier’s cell sites. The
government obtained 12,898 data points cataloging Carpen-
ter’s movements over 127 days. These data points created a
map of Carpenter’s location that placed him at the robbery. The
Sixth Circuit held that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the CSLI because he had turned that infor-
mation over to third parties: his wireless carriers. 
The Supreme Court reversed in a majority opinion written
by Chief Justice Roberts. “[A]n individual maintains a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical move-
ments as captured through CSLI.”21 The government therefore
needed a warrant, supported by probable cause, to obtain Car-
penter’s CSLI. 
This was significant because the Court has long held that “a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”22 This is the so-called
third-party doctrine. The doctrine originated in United States v.
Miller,23 where the Court held that a person lacked an expecta-
tion of privacy in bank records turned over to the bank. In Smith
v. Maryland, another foundational third-party doctrine case, the
Court similarly held that a person didn’t have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in outgoing phone numbers dialed on a
landline telephone and conveyed to the phone company.  
CSLI is, the Court held in Carpenter, “qualitatively differ-
ent.”24 Unlike the information
turned over to third parties in
Miller and Smith, “cell phone
location information is detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly
compiled.”25 The Court rea-
soned that, “when Smith was
decided in 1979, few could have
imagined a society in which a
phone goes wherever its owner
goes, conveying to the wireless
carrier not just dialed digits, but
a detailed and comprehensive
record of the person’s move-
ments.”26 And “CSLI is an
entirely different species of busi-
ness record—something that implicates basic Fourth Amend-
ment concerns about arbitrary government power much more
directly than corporate tax or payroll ledgers.”27 So even
though Carpenter conveyed his data to a third party, he could
claim Fourth Amendment protection in it. 
The Court also relied on United States v. Jones,28 which held
that attaching a GPS tracking device to a vehicle was a Fourth
Amendment search. CSLI presents an even greater privacy con-
cern than the GPS monitoring considered in Jones because
individuals “compulsively carry cell phones with them all the
time . . . into private residences, doctor’s officers, political
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales,”29 allow-
ing the government to achieve near-perfect, retroactive sur-
veillance of almost anyone. 
Cell phone users also take no affirmative steps to turn
over CSLI to the third-party carrier. Because carrying a cell
phone is indispensable to modern life, Carpenter “in no
meaningful sense” voluntarily turned his information over
to a third party. 
No fewer than four dissenting opinions were filed in this
case. Justice Kennedy argued that the majority unnecessarily
departed from the Court’s third-party doctrine precedents. In a
separate dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the CSLI wasn’t
Carpenter’s property, so he did not have a reasonable expecta-
tion in it. He called the Katz reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test “a failed experiment”30 and would get rid of it
entirely. Justice Alito’s dissent criticized the majority for desta-
bilizing Fourth Amendment law and argued that “the records
are not Carpenter’s in any sense.”31
Justice Gorsuch would get rid of the third-party doctrine
and the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. He does
“not agree with the Court’s decision today to keep Smith and
Miller on life support and supplement them with a new and
multilayered inquiry that seems to be only Katz-squared.”32
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He’d overrule those cases and
“look to a more traditional Fourth
Amendment approach.”33
Although the majority called
this a “narrow” decision,34 it’s
likely to have broad impact. The
third-party doctrine now appears
to be, as Justice Gorsuch wrote,
“on life support.”35
This was a welcome develop-
ment for those concerned with privacy rights in the digital age.
The third-party doctrine has faced mounting criticism in
recent years, most notably from Justice Sotomayor, who in
2012 called the doctrine, “ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”36
And CSLI isn’t the only type of encyclopedic information
people reveal to third parties on a daily basis: “Emailing, tweet-
ing, instant messaging, surfing searching liking, and down-
loading all create an inescapable trail of third-party records
that may raise constitutional concerns on par with CSLI.”37
Advocates can now plausibly argue that an officer needs a war-
rant to obtain various kinds of digital data turned over to third
parties. The Electronic Frontier Foundation and American
Civil Liberties Union have already filed lawsuits in Massachu-
setts and Maine seeking to expand Carpenter to warrantless
searches of real-time (as opposed to historical) cell phone loca-
tion information.38
Like Carpenter, Byrd tackled Fourth Amendment “stand-
ing,” but in a different context. There, an officer had stopped
and searched a rental car driven by Terrence Byrd. Byrd wasn’t
listed on the rental agreement as an authorized driver. The
Court unanimously held, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy,
that “as a general rule, someone in otherwise lawful possession
and control of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in it even if the rental agreement does not list him or her
as an authorized driver.”39 Byrd could therefore challenge the
search of the car. On remand, the Supreme Court invited the
court below to address whether a person who intentionally
uses a third party to rent a car by fraudulent scheme is no bet-
ter than a thief.
Byrd had argued in the alternative that he had Fourth
Amendment standing because of his common-law property
interest in the rental car as a second bailee. This argument
arises from Jones, where the Court found that attaching a GPS
device to a vehicle was a Fourth Amendment search based on
common-law trespass law, rather than on the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test from Katz v. United States.40 But Byrd
failed to raise this argument in the District Court or Court of
Appeals, so the majority declined to address it. 
Justice Alito wrote a concurrence listing factors that may
bear on a driver’s ability to claim a Fourth Amendment inter-
est in a rental car. Justice Thomas authored an additional,
intriguing concurrence that Justice Gorsuch joined. He
expressed “serious doubts about the ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’ test from Katz v. United States.”41 He then explains the
types of arguments he’d like to hear from future litigants on
common-law property rights concepts and the Fourth Amend-
ment. He asks litigants to argue “what kind of property inter-
est . . . individuals need before something can be considered
‘their . . . effec[t]’ under the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment” and “what body of law determines whether that
property interest is present.”42
The Third Circuit has now considered Byrd on remand from
the Supreme Court. It initially declined to suppress the fruit of
the search because it was authorized by circuit precedent at the
time it was conducted, so the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applied. On rehearing, though, the court
vacated that ruling and sent the case back to the district court
for additional fact-finding.43
Collins also involved a vehicle search—this time of a
motorcycle parked in a driveway adjacent to a home. A police
officer had probable cause to believe that the motorcycle was
stolen. So he walked up the driveway, lifted a tarp covering
the motorcycle, and found the license plate and vehicle iden-
tification numbers. The officer then ran the numbers, con-
firming the theft. The parties agreed that lifting the tarp was
a search under the Fourth Amendment. The issue was
whether the officer needed a warrant, which he didn’t have,
to do the search.
The majority, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, said yes.
A house’s curtilage includes its driveway. The automobile
exception to the warrant requirement didn’t apply because that
exception’s scope “extends no further than the automobile
itself.”44 The officer invaded the space of the curtilage before
reaching the motorcycle, and the Fourth Amendment protects
that space, so he needed a warrant. This is no different from an
officer who sees a stolen motorcycle through the window of a
living room and then enters the house to search the vehicle. 
Justice Thomas wrote another concurrence favoring major
changes to settled Fourth Amendment law. He argued that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to the states because it “appears
nowhere in the Constitution, postdates the founding by more
than a century, and contradicts several longstanding principles
164 Court Review - Volume 54 
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of the common law.”45 As federal common law, Justice Thomas
asserts, the exclusionary rule doesn’t bind the states. 
Justice Alito wrote the lone dissent, arguing that the search
was reasonable because the motorcycle “could have been
uncovered and ridden away in a matter of seconds” and the
officer’s “brief walk up the driveway impaired no real privacy
interests.”46 He quoted Oliver Twist: “If that is the law” then
“‘the law is a ass—a idiot.’”47
Wesby is an odd little case. It considered a lawsuit by sixteen
individuals against officers of the District of Columbia for ille-
gally arresting them during a debaucherous party in a house
they didn’t have permission to occupy. The officers arrived at the
house at 1:00 AM in response to a noise complaint. Upon entry,
they smelled marijuana and saw beer bottles and cups of liquor
on a filthy floor. There was no furniture downstairs except a few
metal chairs. A makeshift strip club was operating in the living
room and a naked woman and several men were in an upstairs
bedroom, where open condom wrappers were strewn about on
a bare mattress. The partygoers scattered and hid when the offi-
cers arrived. The partygoers also gave conflicting stories as to
why they were there. The Court held that these facts gave the
officers probable cause to arrest the partygoers for trespassing.
The court below erred by finding innocent explanations for each
fact in isolation: “The totality-of-the-circumstances test ‘pre-
cludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.’”48
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Court decided one double jeopardy case of note this
Term. Currier v. Virginia49 was a 5–4 decision holding that a
defendant can waive a double jeopardy claim by agreeing to a
severance. Michael Currier was acquitted of burglary and lar-
ceny charges, then tried separately on a felon-in-possession
charge. The government’s theory in its felon-in-possession case
was that Currier had the gun during that same burglary and
larceny. Currier argued that this violated his double jeopardy
rights, even though he’d consented to the severance. 
The Court disagreed. Justices Alito and Thomas and Chief
Justice Roberts joined Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion. It
held that Currier gave up his right to challenge the second trial
on double jeopardy grounds by agreeing to the severance. The
plurality then wrote that the Double Jeopardy Clause doesn’t
include a right to issue preclusion at all. Justice Kennedy con-
curred but only on the grounds that Currier consented to the
second trial and so can’t complain of it.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. She argued that Currier’s con-
sent to a severance didn’t waive his right to rely on the issue-
preclusive effect of acquittal. After all, courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver of a constitu-
tional right. Justice Ginsburg also took issue with the plural-
ity’s quest to “take us back to the
days before the Court recognized
issue preclusion as a constitution-
ally grounded component of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.”50 She
“would not engage in that
endeavor to restore things past.”51
SIXTH AMENDMENT
This Term the Court decided
two noteworthy Sixth Amend-
ment cases: an important case on
decision making in the attorney-client relationship and one
per curiam reversal. 
In McCoy v. Louisiana,52 Court considered a defendant’s right
not to admit guilt at his capital murder trial. Robert McCoy was
charged with three counts of murder. He expressly objected to
his attorney’s strategy of admitting guilt at trial to try to avoid
the death penalty. The attorney reasonably believed that the evi-
dence against McCoy was overwhelming and so told the jury at
the guilt phase that McCoy was guilty to gain credibility and
ask for their mercy at the sentencing phase.  
Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion. It held that “a
defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admit-
ting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that
confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the
death penalty.”53 Like the decisions whether to plead guilty,
waive the right to a jury trial, testify, and forgo an appeal, the
decision whether “the objective of the defense is to assert inno-
cence” belongs to the defendant. The Sixth Amendment “‘speaks
of the “assistance” of counsel, and an assistant, however expert,
is still an assistant.’”54 This is true even if the client has mental
health issues, as McCoy himself appears to have had.
In Florida v. Nixon,55 the Court had held that defense coun-
sel could concede a capital defendant’s guilt at trial when the
defendant neither consents nor objects to that strategy. The
majority opinion in McCoy distinguished Nixon in that
McCoy “vociferously insisted that he did not engage in the
charged acts and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt.”
It is therefore error for defense counsel to admit a capital defen-
dant’s guilt over his express objection but not if he says nothing.
The Court further held in McCoy that the Sixth Amendment
violation was structural error not amenable to harmless error
review. It also noted that McCoy’s lawyer wouldn’t have vio-
lated his ethical obligations by presenting his client’s proposed
alibi defense, as there was no avowed perjury.  
Justice Alito wrote a dissent that Justices Thomas and Gor-
such joined. He argued that McCoy’s attorney didn’t actually
admit guilt because he told the jury that McCoy lacked the req-
uisite intent. McCoy’s attorney thus only admitted one element
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of the offense—that McCoy killed
three people—but not that he was
guilty. 
Sexton v. Beaudreaux56 was a
per curiam reversal of the Ninth
Circuit’s grant of habeas relief on
ineffective assistance of counsel
grounds. Nicholas Beaudreaux
was convicted of murder in Cali-
fornia and sentenced to fifty years
to life. A witness to the shooting
identified Beaudreaux at a pretrial hearing and then at trial.
He’d been shown two photo lineups of Beaudreaux earlier but
had only tentatively identified him from those. Beaudreaux
argued in his habeas petition that his trial attorney was inef-
fective for failing to file a motion to suppress the identification.
The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the circumstances sur-
rounding the identification were unduly suggestive because
Beaudreaux’s photo was in both photo lineups.
The Supreme Court disagreed. “The Ninth Circuit’s opinion
was not just wrong. It also committed fundamental errors that
this Court has repeatedly admonished courts to avoid.”57
Because this was a federal habeas petition, the Ninth Circuit
needed to give the state court decision more deference. Once
again, the Supreme Court is seen reigning in the Ninth Circuit
in a habeas case.58
FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES
The Court decided two remarkable Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clause cases this Term: Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission59 and Trump v. Hawaii.60
These weren’t criminal cases but will likely impact future crim-
inal cases that implicate the religion clauses, such as those
where a criminal defendant alleges that the charged statute dis-
criminates against her religion.   
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court held that the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of a baker who objected
to baking a cake for a same-sex wedding violated the baker’s
right to freely exercise his religion. The Commissioner made
statements on the record that the Court found hostile to the
baker’s sincerely held religious beliefs: 
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to jus-
tify all kinds of discrimination throughout history,
whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust,
whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of sit-
uations where freedom of religion has been used to jus-
tify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to
use their religion to hurt others.61
The Commission also treated other bakers’ conscience-
based objections differently from Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
claim. This “violated that State’s duty under the First Amend-
ment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion
or religious viewpoint.”62
Justice Kagan wrote a concurrence that Justice Breyer
joined. It argued there were permissible ways in which the
Commission could have distinguished the other conscience-
based objections. Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate concur-
rence, which Justice Alito joined, disagreeing with Justice
Kagan’s concurrence. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gor-
such, wrote yet another concurrence, arguing that the Com-
mission violated the baker’s freedom of expression in addition
to his free exercise rights. Justice Ginsburg authored a dissent
that Justice Sotomayor joined. In her opinion, the “different
outcomes the Court features don’t evidence hostility to religion
of the kind we have previously held to signal a free-exercise
violation, nor do the comments by one or two members of one
of the four decisionmaking entities considering this case jus-
tify reversing the judgment below.”63
Trump v. Hawaii64 was a closely watched case in which the
Court considered the constitutionality of Trump’s second exec-
utive order limiting immigration from designated countries.
Trump’s first executive order suspended people from entering
the country from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen. This caused massive protests at airports across the
country.65 The Western District of Washington entered a
restraining order blocking that executive order and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. Trump then replaced his first executive order
with a Proclamation restricting entry from Iran, North Korea,
Syria, Chad, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Venezuela. 
The plaintiffs in Trump v. Hawaii argued that the Proclama-
tion violates the Establishment Clause because it was moti-
vated by animus toward Islam. They relied on statements
Trump made during his campaign, such as his “Statement on
Preventing Muslim Immigration,” where he called for a “total
and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States
until our Country’s representatives can figure out what is going
on” and his statement that “Islam hates us.”66 They also noted
that, after Trump’s inauguration, Rudolph Giuliani said in a
television interview that Trump had asked him to find a way to
do his “Muslim ban” legally.67
But the Court held, in a 5–4 opinion authored by Chief Jus-
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tice Roberts, that the facially neutral Proclamation didn’t vio-
late the Establishment Clause because “the admission and
exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments
largely immune from judicial control.’”68
The Court also took the opportunity to overrule Korematsu
v. United States, albeit in meticulously narrow language: “The
forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps,
solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlaw-
ful and outside the scope of Presidential authority.”69
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor highlighted the apparent
inconsistencies between Masterpiece Cakeshop and Hawaii v.
Trump. She also criticized the majority’s deference to the exec-
utive branch:
By blindly accepting the Government’s misguided
invitation to sanction a discriminatory policy motivated
by animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name
of a superficial claim of national security, the Court rede-
ploys the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu
and merely replaces one “gravely wrong” decision with
another. 
The Constitution demands, and our country
deserves, a Judiciary willing to hold the coordinate
branches to account when they defy our most sacred
legal commitments.70
TIDBITS
This Term the Court also decided a couple federal habeas
cases worth brief mention. It also avoided ruling on the merits
of two important criminal cases likely to come back before the
Court in the future.  
Wilson v. Sellers71 held that when a federal court considers a
federal habeas petition challenging an unexplained state rul-
ing, it should “look through” the summary decision to the last
related state-court decision providing a rationale.  Tharpe v.
Sellers72 was a per curiam reversal of the Eleventh Circuit,
which had disposed of Tharpe’s petition to reopen his federal
habeas proceeding.  Tharpe claims that his jury was biased
against him based on his race.  He has a sworn affidavit from a
white juror stating that “there are two types of black people: 1.
Black folks and 2. Niggers” and that Tharpe, “who wasn’t in
the ‘good’ black folks category in my book, should get the elec-
tric chair for what he did;” the juror also said he wondered if
“black people even have souls.”73
In Kansas v. Vogt,74 the Court was set to decide whether
using statements at a pretrial hearing violates the Fifth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against compelling a person to be a witness
against himself.  The Court dismissed the case as improvi-
dently granted, leaving a circuit split in place. 
The Court similarly declined to decide the merits in United
States v. Sanchez–Gomez.75 There the Ninth Circuit had held
that shackling pretrial detainees violates the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court held that the case was moot because the
defendants were no longer in pretrial detention. 
THE TERM AHEAD
The 2018–19 Term is now underway, with the Court set to
decide many important criminal cases this year. It has granted
cert in Gamble v. United States, which asks it to overrule the
separate sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause
and hold that a person can’t be convicted of the same crime at
the state and federal levels. 
In Timbs v. Indiana, the Court will decide if the Excessive
Fines Clause is incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. At stake is whether the states can
impose excessive civil forfeiture and other fines on criminal
defendants, who are usually already impoverished.76
Garza v. Idaho is a Sixth Amendment case worth watching.
The Court will decide whether there’s a presumption of preju-
dice when a client tells her attorney to file a notice of appeal
and the attorney doesn’t do so because the client’s plea agree-
ment included an appeal waiver.
The Court will also consider two death penalty cases of
note—without, of course, the input of retired Justice Kennedy.
In Madison v. Alabama, the Court will consider whether the
Eighth Amendment prohibits executing an inmate with severe
dementia that prevents him from remembering his crime and
understanding his execution. Renowned civil rights attorney
Bryan Stevenson argued on Madison’s behalf. 
Bucklew v. Precythe involves an inmate with a rare medical
condition, who seeks to bring an as-applied Eighth Amend-
ment challenge to Missouri’s lethal injection protocol. The case
may very well turn on Justice Kavanaugh’s vote. He seemed
sympathetic to the inmate’s claim at oral argument, asking Mis-
souri’s attorney: “Are you saying even if the method creates
gruesome and brutal pain you can still do it because there’s no
alternative?”77
The real question is how Justice Kennedy’s replacement will
alter the course of death penalty law in the years to come.
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